We ran into an issue with Microsoft Remote Assistance (MSRA) after disabling RC4 encryption support. I was having a hell of a time troubleshooting the issue and eventually resorted to WireShark for troubleshooting.
WireShark for the MSRA traffic showed that the Encryption type used for MSRA is AES as it should be. No problem there. Then I looked at the kerberos traffic specifically and seen alternating KRB5KCD_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN and KDC_ERR-ETYPE-NOSUPP. So the issue was not MSRA but kerberos.
Diving further I found that the TGS-REQ packet in WireShark showed the principal target was not the machine as I expected, but instead, the end-user. So, fun fact there, when you MSRA to a machine, your kerberos ticket is generated for the end-user, not for the machine account. We checked the “This account supports AES” check boxes in AD for the target user, and still the issue occurred.
I checked the logs on the domain controller and came across one in the Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center category. It was a KDCEVENT_NO_KEY_INTERSECTION_TGS which stated “While processing a TGS request for the target server, the account did not have a suitable key for generating a kerberos ticket (the missing key has an ID of #). The requested etypes were # 23 #. The accounts available etypes were 23. Changing or resetting the password of will generate a proper key.” This pretty much explicitly stated the fix.
While we had matching supported encryption methods, the target user had to change their password for the AES support to kick in! So, if you disable RC4 support, ensure your user accounts have the AES check boxes set, and then make sure they change their passwords shortly after, or at least before you need to use MSRA to assist them.